

## Message Text

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 W

----- 025859

P R 051115Z JUN 74

FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9645

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY ROME

USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

USMISSION NATO

USMISSION GENEVA

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EXDIS

GENEVA FOR CSCE DEL

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, US, UR, FR

SUBJECT: COORDINATION OF OUR CSCE POLICY WITH THE FRENCH

REF: (A) GENEVA 3155; (B) STATE 86851; (C) USNATO 2630;

(D) STATE 24424; (E) STATE 112720

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: AN IMPORTANT FOREIGN POLICY ISSUE  
FACING THE NEW FRENCH GOVERNMENT IN COMING WEEKS WILL BE  
THE CSCE. NEW GOF IS LIKELY TO CONTINUE A FAIRLY HARD  
LINE IN PRESSING FOR SOVIET CONCESSIONS ON BASKET III.  
WE RECOMMEND MAKING AN EXTRA EFFORT TO COORDINATE CSCE  
STRATEGY WITH FRANCE AND THE OTHER ALLIES AS AN EARNEST  
OF OUR INTENT TO WORK TOGETHER IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF  
DETENTE. IN PARTICULAR, WE SHOULD STRIVE TO FACE THE  
SOVIETS WITH UNITED, STRONG WESTERN POSITIONS ON BASKET  
III. ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES AS SEEN FROM PARIS AND OUR  
RECOMMENDATIONS FOLLOW. END SUMMARY.

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2. FROM THE BEGINNING, THE SOVIETS AND THE EUROPEANS

HAVE ASCRIBED GREATER IMPORTANCE TO THE CSCE THAN WE HAVE. AS THE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE PROCEEDED, HOWEVER, OUR STAKE IN THEM HAS INEVITABLY INCREASED. TO A DEGREE WE NOW APPEAR CAUGHT BETWEEN CONFLICTING OBJECTIVES OF THESE TWO PARTIES. FROM THE PARIS VANTAGE POINT, IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT THE CONFERENCE NOW OFFERS BOTH OPPORTUNITY AND HAZARD. THE OPPORTUNITY IS THAT THE US MIGHT BE ABLE TO USE THE STRONG SOVIET INTEREST IN CONCLUDING THE CSCE AT A SUMMIT LEVEL TO WIN SOVIET CONCESSIONS ON CSCE OR ON OTHER DETENTE ISSUES OF INTEREST TO THE U.S. THE HAZARD IS THAT OUR ALLIES MIGHT INTERPRET U.S. EFFORTS TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THIS OPPORTUNITY AS DESIGNED TO FURTHER PRIMARILY U.S. INTERESTS.

3. THERE HAS LONG BEEN A SUSPICION AMONG SOME EUROPEANS THAT WE MAY BE PUTTING US-SOVIET DETENTE AHEAD OF ATLANTIC SOLIDARITY. TO SUPPORT THIS VIEW, THEY HAVE CITED THE ORIGINAL CSCE-MBFR LINKAGE ON TIMING; THE PASSAGE IN THE PRESIDENT'S COMMUNIQUE WITH BREZHNEV LAST JUNE ON POSSIBILITIES FOR A THIRD-STAGE SUMMIT, THE FACT THAT WE DID NOT BRIEF OUR ALLIES ON BREZHNEV'S LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT EARLY THIS YEAR (IN CONTRAST TO ALLIED BRIEFINGS ON SIMILAR LETTERS TO THEIR HEADS OF STATE), AND OUR ACTIVE ROLE IN NEGOTIATING THE INVIOABILITY OF FRONTIERS PRINCIPLE BEFORE THE EASTER RECESS. WE RECOGNIZE THAT THESE VIEWS AND SUSPICIONS MAY HAVE BEEN ADDRESSED ON A VARIETY OF OCCASIONS IN HIGH LEVEL CONSULTATIONS ON THE CSCE AND ON OTHER ISSUES. UNFORTUNATELY, OUR ASSURANCES ARE NOT ALWAYS ACCEPTED AT FACE VALUE OR DO NOT FILTER DOWN TO SENIOR WORKING LEVELS. AT LEAST THIS IS TRUE IN REGARD TO FRANCE.

4. IN ANY EVENT, AS THE MOSCOW SUMMIT APPROACHES, WE ANTICIPATE THAT THESE SUSPICIONS COULD RE-EMERGE. AT THE SAME TIME, WITH THE RECENT CHANGES OF GOVERNMENT IN EUROPE, AND ESPECIALLY IN FRANCE, NOW SEEMS AN AUSPICIOUS TIME TO DISABUSE THE PURVEYORS OF THE "CONDOMINIUM" THESIS OF THE NOTION THAT WE REGARD DETENTE AS PRIMARILY A SOVIET-AMERICAN GAME.

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5. THE CSCE SEEMS UNIQUELY SUITED TO THIS PURPOSE, ESPECIALLY AS REGARDS THE FRENCH. IT IS ONE OF THE FEW ARENAS OF EAST-WEST CONTACT IN WHICH WE AND THE FRENCH ARE JOINTLY ENGAGED. WHILE THE FRENCH HAVE SHUNNED MBFR, EXPRESSED SKEPTICISM ON SALT, REFUSED TO SIGN THE NPT OR SUBSCRIBE TO THE LIMITED TEST BAN, AND STAYED OUT OF THE CCD, THEY HAVE PARTICIPATED FAIRLY ACTIVELY IN THE EUROPEAN CONFERENCE.

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6. ON THE WHOLE, WE SHARE WITH THE FRENCH A BROADER BASIS OF COMMON INTEREST AND VIEWPOINT ON CSCE THAN IS THE CASE WITH SOME ASPECTS OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS. WE APPEAR TO HAVE DIFFERENCES ON ONLY FOUR ISSUES, AND ON THREE OF THEM, WE SEE SIGNS OF FRENCH FLEXIBILITY. IT IS OUR IMPRESSION THAT, DESPITE THEIR MEDITERRANEAN INTERESTS, THE FRENCH ARE SOMEWHAT LESS ENTHUSIASTIC THAN THE ITALIANS OVER A SEPARATE MEDITERRANEAN DECLARATION, AND THE FRENCH HAVE BEGUN TO YIELD TO OUR OBJECTIONS OVER THE ISSUE OF EUROPEAN EXCLUSIVITY IN BASKET III. ON CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES, WE BELIEVE THE FRENCH WILL GO ALONG WITH WHAT APPEARS TO BE AN EMERGING COMPROMISE BETWEEN US AND THE EC, ESPECIALLY ON THE QUESTION OF MILITARY MOVEMENTS.

7. HOWEVER, THE KEY ISSUE AT THE CSCE NOW HAS BECOME

HOW FAR WE SHOULD PUSH THE SOVIETS FOR CONCESSIONS ON  
BASKET III, AND THIS IS WHERE WE BELIEVE THE FRENCH AS  
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WELL AS CERTAIN OF THE OTHER ALLIES, MAY TAKE A STRONGER  
STAND THAN WE SEEM PREPARED TO SUPPORT. THE STATEMENT  
BY THE FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE AT THE SPC ON MAY 13 (REF  
C), TO THE EFFECT THAT THERE WOULD BE NO REASON TO MOVE  
TO THE THIRD STAGE IF THERE WERE NO CHANGES IN THE SOVIET  
POSITION ON ISSUES IN BASKET III, ACCORDS WITH COMMENTS  
HERE BY FRENCH OFFICIALS. WHILE GISCARD HAS NOT YET  
MENTIONED THE CSCE TO THE BEST OF OUR KNOWLEDGE, THERE  
SEEMS GOOD REASON TO BELIEVE THAT HE WILL TAKE A STRONG  
LINE TOWARDS THE SOVIETS, AND WE AGREE WITH THE SPECULA-  
TION REPORTED FROM GENEVA (REF A) THAT THE FRENCH WILL  
PROBABLY RESIST MOVING QUICKLY TO FINISH THE CONFERENCE.  
THUS THE ONLY ISSUE THAT APPEARS FROM OUR VANTAGE POINT  
TO BE A MAJOR POTENTIAL CLEAVAGE BETWEEN US AND THE  
FRENCH IS THE BREAKING POINT AT WHICH WE WILL DETERMINE  
WHETHER TO GO FURTHER THAN THE INSTRUCTIONS IN REFTEL E  
AND CONSIDER PUTTING GREATER PRESSURE ON THE SOVIETS.

8. IF THIS ISSUE INDEED BECOMES ONE FOR DISCUSSION, WE  
AGREE (REF E) THAT THE PROS AND CONS SHOULD BE THRASHED  
OUT NOT ONLY IN THE NAC BUT IN CAPITALS AS WELL. HOW-  
EVER, WE SUSPECT THAT THE SOVIETS MAY BE COUNTING ON US  
TO MAKE THE ARGUMENT FOR -- OR AT THE VERY LEAST NOT  
OPPOSE -- GOING AHEAD WITH THE THIRD PHASE WITHOUT  
MAJOR CONCESSIONS IN BASKET III, AND WE FEAR THAT THIS  
COULD BECOME AN APPLE OF DISCORD BETWEEN US AND OUR NATO  
PARTNERS. TO LESSEN THIS POSSIBILITY, WE RECOMMEND  
MAKING AN EXTRA EFFORT TO STAY IN STEP WITH OUR ALLIES.  
GIVEN OUR SPECIAL ROLE BEFORE EASTER IN HELPING OBTAIN A  
TEXT ACCEPTABLE TO THE SOVIETS ON THE INVIOABILITY OF

FRONTIERS, WE RECOMMEND BEING EQUALLY FORCEFUL IN  
SUPPORTING OUR ALLIES IN THE ARGUMENT THAT IT IS MOSCOW'S  
TURN TO MAKE CONCESSIONS IN BASKET III.

9. IN ANY CASE, AS SEEN FROM PARIS, THE CSCE PROVIDES  
A TEST OF US-EUROPEAN PARTNERSHIP. AS THE NEGOTIATIONS  
AND OUR CONSULTATIONS PROCEED, THE EUROPEANS, AND PARTI-  
CULARLY THE NEW FRENCH GOVERNMENT, WILL BE WATCHING  
CLOSELY TO SEE HOW OUR PRIORITIES TAKE SHAPE IN RELATION  
TO DETENTE AND WESTERN EUROPEAN INTERESTS.

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